In a multiagent process management system the distribution of work is achieved by negotiated delegation of responsibility for sub-processes by one agent to another. The responsibility delegation mechanism is based on a combination of estimates for subjective and objective payoff measures. This leads to estimates of the probability that one agent is a better choice than another. The probability of delegating responsibility to an agent is then expressed as a function of these probability estimates. This apparently convoluted probabilistic method is easy to compute and gives good results in process management applications even when successive payoff measurements are unpredictably varied.
INTRODUCTION
The responsibility delegation mechanism described is based on a combination of subjective and objective payoff measures that give estimates of the expected relative value in delegating responsibility to one agent or another. This leads to estimates of the probability that one agent is a better choice than another. The probability of delegating responsibility to an agent is then expressed as a function of these probability estimates. This method defines one set of probabilities in terms of another. It is easy to compute and gives good results in process management applications even when successive payoff measurements are unpredictably varied.
The method has general application to multiagent negotiation in areas other than process management. For example in electronic business agents place a subjective value on other agents that recognises the value of those agents as business associates. The way in which this subjective value measure is combined with objective payoff measures enables an agent to express its preferences on whether to place its business with a valued associate or to chance an offer from a less-trusted agent that appears to present a more attractive deal.
DELEGATION
A delegation strategy is a mechanism for deciding who to give responsibility to for doing what. If agent X 0 wishes to delegate responsibility then: first X 0 announces a proposal to a focussed subset of n agents in its community {X 1 ,...,X i ,...,X n }, second X 0 receives bids from these n agents, and third X 0 chooses an agent from this set. The strategies considered here achieve this indirectly by determining instead n probabilities {P 1 ,...,P i ,...,P n } where P i is the probability that the i'th agent will be selected, and S i P i = 1. The choice of the agent to delegate to is then made with these probabilities. By expressing the delegation strategy in terms of probabilities, the agents have the flexibility to balance conflicting goals, such as achieving process quality and process efficiency.
Pr(X i ») denotes the rank of agent X i . Rank is "the probability that agent X i is the 'best' choice of agent, chosen from {X 1 ,...,X i ,...,X n }, to delegate responsibility to". A delegation strategy is a set {P 1 ,...,P i ,...,P n } where S i P i = 1. The delegation strategies described here are determined by:
for some function f that preserves the constraint S i P i = 1.
The probabilities Pr(X i ») are calculated at the time at which the delegation is made. They are based on various estimates of future performance that are combined to give a single expected payoff vector for each agent n i . The payoff vector contains sufficient information to estimate the probability that one agent is expected to deliver higher payoff than another in some sense.
PAYOFF: { n i }
There are five measures for agent X 0 . Three are: time, cost and likelihood of success which are attached to all of its plans and sub-plans. The remaining two are value and a delegate parameters that are attached to other agents. Time is the total time taken to termination. Cost is the actual cost of the of resources allocated. For example, if an agent has a virtual document in its 'in-tray' then the time observation will be the total time that that document spent with that agent, and the cost may derived from the time that the agent-possibly with a human 'assistant'-actually spent working on that document. not refer to costs incurred by the plan-this is considered in the eBusiness applications described in Sec. 7.] The likelihood of success is the probability that a plan will terminate successfully within its constraints. The value parameter is the value added to a process by a plan. Each agent represents the perceived subjective value of each other agent's work as a constant value for that agent.
The three measures time, cost and likelihood of success are recorded every time a plan or delegation is activated for a goal. This generates a large amount of data whose significance can reasonably be expected to degrade over time. Rather than record the raw data it is summarised using the geometric mean. Given a set of observations { ob i } where ob 1 is the most recent observation:
is the geometric mean where a is some constant, 0 < a < 1. If the observations { ob i } for some parameter p are drawn from a symmetrically distributed population then the geometric mean gives a point estimate of the mean of the population m p :
is a (geometric) estimate of 2/p times the standard deviation of parameter p, s p . Where the constant a is determined empirically.
We now assume that the parameters time and cost are normally distributed. This is "not unreasonable", and is highly desirable because the geometric means may be updated with the simple formulae:
with starting values m p initial and s p initial . The likelihood of success observations are binary-ie "success" or "fail"-and so the likelihood of success parameter is binomially distributed, which is approximately normally distributed under the standard conditions.
Finally, consider measurements of the delegate parameter for each agent. This parameter is the pair: w in i is the amount of work delegated to agent i in a given discrete time period, and, w out i is the amount of work delegated by agent i in the same discrete time period: delegate new = (1 -a) _ w i + a _ delegate old , The two components of the delegate parameter are not normally distributed and the standard deviation is not estimated. The delegate and value estimates are associated with individuals. The time, cost and likelihood of success estimates are attached to plans and delegations.
RANK: { Pr(X i ») }
A bid consists of the five pairs of real numbers (Constraint, Delegate, Success, Cost, Time). The pair Constraint is an estimate of the earliest time that the agent could address the task-ie ignoring other non-urgent things to be done, and an estimate of the time that the agent would normally address the task if it "took its place in the queue".
The method described above estimates the probability Pr(A»B) that one agent, A, is a better choice than another, B. It may be extended to estimate the probability that one agent is a better choice than a number of other agents. 
STRATEGY: { P i }
Given a sub-process, an expectation of the payoff n i as a result of choosing X i from {X 1 ,...,X i ,...,X n } to take responsibility for it, and of the probability Pr(X i ») that X i is the best choice. A delegation strategy at any given time is a set S = {P 1 ,...,P i ,...,P n } where P i is the probability of delegating responsibility at that time for a given task to agent X i chosen from {X 1 ,...,X i ,...,X n }.
If community culture is to choose the agent whose expected payoff is maximal then the delegation strategy best is:
is such that Pr(X i ») is maximal 0 otherwise
The strategy best attempts to maximise expected payoff. Another strategy prob also favours high payoff but gives all agents a chance, sooner or later, and is defined by P i = Pr(X i »). The strategies best and prob have the feature of 'rewarding' quality work (ie. high payoff) with more work.
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